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I. Introduction
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, an oil rig operated
by BP, exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, killing eleven crew
members and beginning one of the worst economic and
environmental disasters ever experienced by the Gulf Coast
region.! The rig was drilling an exploratory well in Mississippi
t B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of
North Carolina School of Law, 2013. 1 would like to thank Amelia Thompson and Dan
Whittle for their helpful advice and insightful comments during the preparation of this
note. I also want to thank Sarah Hill Colwell and my mother, father, and brother for their
constant encouragement and unwavering support. Finally, I would like to thank Lars
Schoultz, who introduced me to the perplexities of U.S.-Cuban relations.
I See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
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Canyon Block 252,2 a deepwater oil prospect BP had been trying
to develop for years. Although the well was nearly complete, its
progress was significantly behind schedule and over budget.'
Realizing the financial drain the project had become, BP
management made several risky judgments affecting the drilling
progress in an effort to save time and reduce some of the costs.'
These shortcuts created serious pressure regulation problems at the
wellhead, the appropriate balance of which is critical to the
deepwater drilling method. At some point, the pressure
imbalance overcame the regulation system, and the well blew out.6
The blowout sent gas barreling up the riser toward the rig, where it
was ignited by sparks from the rig's generators.' For thirty-six
hours, the Deepwater Horizon burned before sinking below the
water's surface on April 22-Earth Day.' It was not readily
DRILLING vi-ix (2011) [hereinafter BP COMM'N REP.].
2 Id. at 47, 89.
3 Id. at 2 (noting that BP and its partners in the Macondo venture had budgeted
$96.2 million and 51 working days for the project, but that the project was $58 million
over budget and six weeks behind schedule as of April 20, 2010).
4 See WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING, BLOWOUT IN THE GULF:
THE BP OIL SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN AMERICA 46-50 (2011)
(discussing the evidence of corner-cutting uncovered by congressional investigators).
For a thorough explanation of the decisions and oversights that contributed to the
blowout, see BP COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 89-127.
5 See BP COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 90-91 ("The principal challenge in
deepwater drilling is to drill a path to the hydrocarbon-filled pay zone in a manner that
simultaneously controls these enormous pressures and avoids fracturing the geologic
formation in which the reservoir is found. It is a delicate balance. The drillers must
balance the reservoir pressure (pore pressure) pushing hydrocarbons into the well with
counter-pressure from inside the wellbore. If too much counter-pressure is used, the
formation can be fractured. But if too little counter-pressure is used, the result can be an
uncontrolled intrusion of hydrocarbons into the well, and a discharge from the well itself
as the oil and gas rush up and out of the well. An uncontrolled discharge is known as a
blowout.").
6 See id at 113-14. Because petroleum reservoirs typically contain compressed
gas, it is not uncommon for some of the gas to shoot out of the well when the reservoir is
breached-this is known as a kick. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 4, at 30. If
a kick is not controlled, the expanding gas could cause a blowout. Id. at 30-31.
7 BP COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 114; CARL SAFINA, A SEA IN FLAMES: THE
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BLOWOUT 44 (2011). The riser is the long pipe connecting the
rig to the blowout preventer, which is a safety valve installed at the top of the well.
FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 4, at 29.
8 FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 4, at xii.
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apparent at the time, but almost one mile below the surface, the
Macondo well leaked a steady stream of crude oil into the Gulf
and would continue to do so for eighty-seven days.9
From the time of the blowout until workers capped it on July
15, 2010, the Macondo well released an average of 2.5 million
gallons per day into the Gulf of Mexico.o For comparison, at this
rate, the Macondo blowout leaked more oil than the 1989 Exxon
Valdez disaster every four and a half days." In total, an estimated
206 million gallons of crude oil spilled into the Gulf 12 At one
point, the oil contaminated one-third of the U.S. portion of the
Gulf of Mexico." The spill dealt a major blow to the Gulf Coast
economy as well.' 4 A substantial portion of the region's economic
activity is based on fishing, tourism, and oil, all of which were
severely impacted by the Macondo blowout." In June 2010, BP
set aside $20 billion to help compensate Gulf Coast businesses and
families for the inevitable economic loss.16 More than two and a
half years later, the region is still struggling to recover.
9 See BP CoMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 131-32, 165.
1o FREtDENBURG & GRAMI NG, supra note 4, at 13.
11 Id.
12 BP Feared Spill of 3.4 Million Gallons a Day, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/bp-feared-gulf-oil-spill-rate-of-3-4-million-
gallonsta-day.html.
13 BP COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 187 (noting that at the most extensive point
of contamination, "88,522 square miles of the Gulf of Mexico was closedto fishing").
14 See id. at 185.
15 See id. More than one-third of the United States' domestic food supply is
produced by the Gulf Coast region, including most of the crawfish, shrimp, blue crabs,
and oysters. Id. at 186-87. Tourism in the coastal regions of the five states that border
the Gulf generates almost $20 billion each year. Id. at 191. The region also supplies
one-third of the nation's domestic oil. Id. at 187.
16 Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP to Set Aside $20 Billion to Help Oil Spill
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at Al. The BP Commission also noted that within
just eight weeks, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility had compensated approximately
127,000 claimants for economic losses, totaling more than $2 billion. BP COMM'N REP.,
supra note 1, at 185. To illustrate the magnitude of the economic damage from the
Deepwater Horizon blowout, consider that over a two year period, the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund paid out just over $7 billion to 5,560 individuals. Id. at 185-
86.
17 See Susan Cosier, Feds Leave Door Open to Hit BP with Top Penalties for Gulf
Spill, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/
2012/09/06/feds-leave-door-open-to-hit-bp-with-top-penalties-for-gulf-spill (discussing
5732013]
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In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the nation's
attention has focused more on the environmental impact of
offshore drilling." In recent years, the Cuban government has
begun to explore the possibility of tapping into oil reserves in the
Straits of Florida, the ninety-mile stretch of water separating
Florida from Cuba.19 The Straits of Florida is significant not only
as the thin separation between longtime political foes but also as
the major conduit for the beginning of the Gulf Stream. 2 0 Any oil
spill picked up by the Gulf Stream could travel through the Straits
of Florida and up the Atlantic Coast, contaminating the entire
coastline of the Southeast Atlantic. 21  The gravity of the danger
presented by an oil spill in the Straits of Florida combined with the
stale relationship between the United States and Cuba has caused
several U.S. officials to express concern about the prospect of
Cuba engaging in offshore drilling, especially because Cuba lacks
the advanced technology necessary to safely explore deepwater oil
reserves. 22 In February 2012, the Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible
oil rig, began drilling the first of several exploratory wells in the
Straits of Florida, only sixty miles from the Florida Keys.23
This situation presents an issue of significant national interest.
It also presents an opportunity to change the tone of a foreign
reports of long-term and still uncovered damage to the region); Elizabeth Skree, Time for
BP to Make Things Right in the Gulf DELTA DISPATCHES (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://www.mississippiriverdelta.org/blog/ 2012/09/06/time-for-bp-to-make-things-right-
in-the-gulf ("The gulf environment and the people and businesses that depend on it are
still reeling from the effects of the spill.").
18 See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41684, OIL SPILL
LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011).
19 See NEELESH NERURKAR & MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41522, CUBA'S OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT: BACKGROUND AND U.S. POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS 1-4, 13 (2011).
20 Id. at 8 n.37.
21 See The U.S., Cuba and Oil Diplomacy, SOLUTIONS: ENVTL. DEF. FUND, Vol. 43,
No. 1, Winter 2012, at 11, available at http://solutions.edf.org/files/2012/
01/12SOL Winter 121211 _rev.pdf.
22 See All Things Considered: Cuban Offshore Drilling Plans Raise US. Concerns
(NPR radio broadcast Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter All Things Considered], available at
http://www.npr.org/2011/09/12/140405282/cuban-offshore-drilling-plans-raise-u-s-
concerns.
23 William Booth, Cuban Drilling Causes U.S. to Scramble, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,
2012, at Al2.
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policy position that has failed for a half-century.24 In order to
avoid another environmental and economic disaster like the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the United States should implement
policy changes that are designed to build a collaborative
relationship with Cuba. This note discusses the current regulatory
issues presented by Cuba's efforts to extract oil from reserves in
the Straits of Florida and suggests changes to U.S. policy that
foster a more cooperative relationship between the United States
and Cuba. The following sections discuss the international and
domestic regulations that inhibit the ability of the United States to
respond to an oil spill in Cuban waters. Next, this note turns to an
analysis of the current proposals for responding to a Cuban oil
spill and their shortcomings. Finally, this note recommends
alternative solutions with an eye toward minimizing the threat of a
spill in the Straits of Florida.
II. Historical Context of U.S.-Cuban Relations
A. Foreign Relations Between the United States and Cuba
Over the last fifty years, the diplomatic relationship between
the United States and Cuba has been tense, if not outright hostile.25
This tension exists because of a fundamental misunderstanding
between the two countries over the distribution of hemispheric
power.26 Although the current Cuban regime has been in power
24 See VICKI HUDDLESTON & CARLOS PASCUAL, LEARNING TO SALSA: NEW STEPS
IN U.S.-CUBA RELATIONs 1 (2010) ("If one compares outcomes to stated objectives, U.S.
policy toward Cuba may be the most significant failure in the history of American
foreign policy.").
25 See generally Carlos Oliva Campos, The Relations of Cuba with Latin America
and the Caribbean: The Long and Winding Road of Reconciliation, in CUBAN-LATIN
AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHANGING HEMISPHERE 17-18 (Gary Prevost
& Carlos Oliva Campos eds., 2011) (noting that the U.S. policy toward the Castro
revolutionary government created a political climate of hostility against Cuba).
26 See LARS SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 2 (2009) [hereinafter SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL
LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC]. Schoultz argues that in some ways, the U.S.-Cuban
relationship is a case study in Thucydides' theory of realism-"the strong will do what
they want, and the weak will accept what they must." Id. at 3-4 (pointing out that the
Cuban economy is 1/250th the size of the U.S. economy). But this particular
relationship also contains an element that falls beyond the theoretical bounds of realism:
when Cubans have refused to bow to the will of the United States, they have generally
gotten away with it. Id. at 4.
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for just over fifty years, it continues to view the United States as
the nineteenth century hegemon that asserted the Monroe
Doctrine.2 7 At the same time, the United States has not done much
to alter that perception; in fact, it has done quite the opposite.2 8
The United States' current policy toward Cuba is largely rooted in
this "misunderstanding."2 9 This section explains the development
of this policy in the historical context.
1. Revolution and the Beginning ofHostilities
On January 1, 1959, a group of revolutionaries led by Fidel
Castro overthrew the Cuban government led by Fulgencio Batista,
a U.S.-friendly dictator who had controlled the island since 1934.'o
Although not initially communist, Washington viewed the new
government's reform positions with apprehension." The
Revolution was seen as a rebellion against the economic
immobilization and social decline that had developed under the
corrupt and oppressive Batista regime.32 As part of its reforms, the
revolutionary government instituted a land reform law, which
27 See Louis A. P6rez, Jr., Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US
Policy Toward Cuba, 34 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 227, 233-34 (2002); see also Rafael
Herndndez, Intimate Enemies: Paradoxes in the Conflict Between the United States and
Cuba, in DEBATING U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS 9, 18 (Jorge I. Dominguez et al. eds., 2012)
("Although Cuban anti-imperialism has been reinforced by fifty years of socialism, the
attitude has been in existence since the colonial era.").
28 See LARS SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY
TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 368 (1998) [hereinafter SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED
STATES]. Schoultz explains that "[blecause they lack physical power, Latin Americans
have never threatened the United States; rather, the fear in Washington has always been
that powerful non-hemispheric powers might suddenly use a base in nearby Latin
America to attack the United States." Id And so, "[o]nce the United States had asserted
its hegemony in Latin America, officials in Washington quickly concluded that it was
important to retain control for a symbolic reason: hegemony over the region became an
indicator of U.S. credibility in international relations." Id. at 368-69.
29 See id at 367.
30 See generally RICHARD Gor, CUBA: A NEW HISTORY 142-72 (2004)
(summarizing the development and ultimate success of the Castro insurrection and the
early stages of the revolutionary government).
31 See generally Alan Luxenberg, Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the Arms of
the Soviets?, in NEIGHBORLY ADVERSARIES: READINGS IN U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN
RELATIONS 159, 159-73 (Michael LaRosa & Frank 0. Mora eds., 2d ed. 2007)
(evaluating the various arguments about whether the Eisenhower administration caused
the Castro regime to embrace communism).
32 See GoTT, supra note 30, at 165-66.
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sought to create a more equitable apportionment of land among the
Cuban people.3 3 The law significantly limited the ability of
noncitizens to invest in Cuban land and provided for the
expropriation of property held by foreign investors.3 4
Although the Eisenhower administration was initially
unenthusiastic about the Castro government, the land reform law
solidified its opposition to the regime." Within the first six
months of the revolutionary government's existence, Washington
determined that the Castro regime must be removed from power.3 6
During the summer of 1959, the State Department, working with
the Central Intelligence Agency, formulated a plan for replacing
the Castro government and, in October, recommended that the
United States support opposition groups in Cuba "while making
Castro's downfall seem to be the result of his own mistakes."37
The plan, which would ultimately result in the Bay of Pigs
invasion, was approved by President Eisenhower in March 1960."
33 See id at 170-71.
34 SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC, supra note 26, at 95 ("The
maximum size of a landholding was limited to thirty caballerias (about one thousand
acres), with the exception of sugar, rice, and cattle lands, which could be up to one
hundred caballerias (about thirty-three hundred acres). Article 6 prohibited tenant
farming, and Article 11 prohibited sharecropping. Article 12 permitted landholdings by
corporations, the typical form of U.S. ownership, but after a year, all the shareholders of
any landowning corporation had to be Cuban citizens. Article 15 stipulated that only
Cubans could acquire rural property in the future, and Article 12 also specified that
anyone who owned shares in a corporation that grew sugarcane could not at the same
time be a shareholder of a corporation that processed the can into raw sugar, a provision
that would deprive processors of about two million acres. In short, U.S. investors would
lose their land.").
35 See GOTr, supra note 30, at 180.
36 See id (noting that the initial decision to overthrow the Castro government was
based on the economic concern arising out of the expropriation of land owned by
American companies, not because the government posed a communist threat). In fact,
Castro did not declare the Revolution to be socialist until the eve of the Bay of Pigs
invasion. See JULIA E. SWEIG, CUBA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNow 42 (2010).
When the Eisenhower administration decided to oust Castro six months into the
Revolution, Cuba had not yet established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
See id. at 78-79.
37 Piero Gleijeses, Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of
Pigs, 24 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 1, 3 (quoting Discussion at the 432nd Meeting of the
National Security Council, Thursday, January 14, 1960 (Mar. 31, 1960) (on file with
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library)).
38 See id. at 4-5 (noting that the plan consisted of four components: (1) organizing
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In April 1961, 1500 U.S.-backed Cuban exiles landed at the
Bay of Pigs in an attempt to overthrow the Castro government.3 9
The invasion was an immediate failure. 4 0  Repelling the exile
forces was a major victory for the Castro government.4 1 It not
only reinforced support for the revolutionary government among
Cubans, it stood as a symbol to the greater Latin American
community that U.S. imperialism could be defeated, providing
legitimacy to the Revolution.4 2 Castro's victory at the Bay of Pigs,
however, did not change Washington's belief that the continued
existence of the regime was a threat to U.S. interests.4 3 In fact,
from Washington's perspective, the regime became more of a
threat in the aftermath of the invasion.4 4
2. Imposing an Embargo
The night before the Bay of Pigs invasion, following a
preemptive air strike, Fidel Castro declared that the Revolution
would be socialist.45 Determined not to repeat the Bay of Pigs
fiasco, the Kennedy administration instead launched a
"multifaceted attack on the Cuban government: diplomatic
isolation, sabotage and assassination, and economic pressure."'46
First, in September 1961, Congress amended the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 to give the president the power to impose
an embargo on commercial transactions with Cuba, which
Kennedy exercised to institute a complete embargo on February 7,
a unified opposition group outside Cuba; (2) developing a radio broadcasting facility that
would broadcast anti-Castro messages; (3) carrying out intelligence operations and other
covert actions and; (4) developing a paramilitary force outside Cuba).
39 See GoTT, supra note 30, at 193-95.
40 See id at 192-94. Although the operation was supposed to be kept secret,
Castro had been expecting it. See id. at 191-93. A freshly reinforced local militia
prevented the exiles from establishing a position on the island, which was critical to the
operation. See id. at 190, 192-94. In just two days, more than 1300 exiles had been
either captured or killed, thwarting the invasion. See id.
41 See id at 193-95.
42 See id at 190-91.
43 See SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC, supra note 26, at 171-
72.
44 See id. at 171-73.
45 See Gorr, supra note 30, at 193.
46 See SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC, supra note 26, at 173.
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1962.47 Washington then convinced members of the Organization
of American States to expel Cuba from the organization, citing its
"incompatibility with the inter-American system."' In addition to
the economic and political hostilities against the Castro
government, the United States also increased its support for
counter-revolutionary forces throughout Cuba.4 9 In response to the
aggressive measures taken by the U.S. government to undermine
the Castro regime, Cuba sought an alliance with the Soviet Union:
Our firm conviction that Yankee imperialism would, under any
pretext, launch its military forces directly against our country,
and our idea that proposed measures to prevent it would help
strengthen the Socialist bloc as a whole, determined our decision
to sign the Cuban-Soviet agreement regarding the deployment of
- 50nuclear weapons in our territory.
In October 1962, U.S.-Cuban relations reached their height of
aggression, bringing the world dangerously close to nuclear war.
In an effort to deter another U.S. invasion, Castro allowed the
Soviet Union to set up nuclear missile installations in Cuba.5 2 For
thirteen days, between October 14 and 26, the world stood on the
brink of nuclear war until Soviet Prime Minister Nikita
Khrushchev ordered that the missiles be removed from Cuba.53
Following the Cuban missile crisis, the United States
continued its economic embargo against the island, implementing
new regulations that prohibited all transactions related to Cuba-
including those between the United States and third countries
involving Cuban goods or U.S. goods being traded by third
47 See ESTEBAN MORALES DOMINGUEZ & GARY PREVOST, UNITED STATES-CUBA
RELATIONS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 49 (2008).
48 Id
49 See id at 50.
50 Id at 51 (quoting Fidel Castro Ruz, Informe central: Primer Congreso del PCC
40-41).
51 See id at 53, 64.
52 See id at 64.
53 See DOMINGUEZ & PREVOST, supra note 47, at 53, 64-65. For a different
perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, see Michael Dobbs, Op-Ed., The Price of a 50-
Year Myth, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 2012, at A31 (arguing that the risk of nuclear war
during the crisis was not created by "a clash of wills" between the United States and the
Soviet Union, but rather "the fog of war" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5792013]
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countries to Cuba. 54 The United States also amended the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit any assistance to the current or
any future government of Cuba until the U.S. owners of property
that had been expropriated in 1959 received compensation. In
short, following the failure of its military efforts to overthrow the
Castro government, Washington turned to a policy colorfully
described as "nut-pinching-an embargo that would make life as
miserable as possible for everyday Cubans."5 6
3. Strengthening the Embargo
For the next twenty-five years, as the Cold War continued
between the United States and the Soviet Union, Washington
generally maintained a strict embargo against Cuba, justifying it
on national security grounds.57 By 1991, however, the effects of
the Soviet Union's collapse had reached Cuba." Without the
support of its Soviet ally, Cuba entered a period of severe
economic deprivation, labeled by Castro as a "Special Period in
Times of Peace." 9 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the national
security interest that had driven U.S. policy toward Cuba
vanished. 60  But rather than move toward reconciliation with its
neighbor, the United States maintained its policy toward the
54 See id. at 73.
55 See id at 74.
56 SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC, supra note 26, at 10.
Professor Schoultz points to a quote from President Lyndon Johnson as the source of this
"nut-pinching" policy toward Cuba: "Inexperienced in foreign affairs, Lyndon Baines
Johnson had waited only a few days after inheriting the White House to seek advice from
the widely respected chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J. William
Fullbright, who warned against doing anything dramatic. 'I'm not getting into any Bay
of Pigs deal,' Johnson interrupted to agree. 'No, I'm just asking you what we ought to do
to pinch their nuts more than we're doing."' Id. at 5.
57 See generally DOMINGUEZ & PREVOST, supra note 47, at 73-95 (discussing U.S.-
Cuban relations during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations).
58 See SWEIG, supra note 36, at 126-27.
59 Id. at 127. Following the Soviet Union's collapse, Cuba's import capacity fell
dramatically-"from $8.1 billion in 1989 to $2.3 billion in 1992." GoTT, supra note 30,
at 288. The loss of its imports shocked other sectors of the economy: "GDP declined by
2.9 per cent in 1990, 10 per cent in 1991, 11.6 per cent in 1992 and 14.9 per cent in
1993." Id.
60 See Lars Schoultz, Washington's Fourth Interest, THE LATIN AMERICANIST,
Sept. 2009, at 141-42, 145.
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island.6 1 This decision was due to the influence of the Cuban
American community, especially those in South Florida.62 In
1984, a group of Cuban exiles formed the Cuban American
National Foundation ("CANF"). 63 Although their numbers are
relatively small, the Cuban American lobby holds considerable
influence in Washington because of Florida's critical status as a
valuable swing state in presidential elections.6 4 It is widely
believed that CANF controls the Latino vote in Florida.6' Thus,
winning the support of the Cuban American community is
essential to winning the Electoral College.66
The Cuban American lobby, largely controlled by CANF, has
taken a hard line on Cuba, supporting pro-embargo policies. In
the 1990s, the lobby used its influence to push two significant
pieces of legislation through Congress-the Cuban Democracy
Act of 199268 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996.69
The Cuban Democracy Act, also known as the Torricelli Act,
was established to broaden "the spectrum of pressures on Cuba
with the manifest goal of speeding up the deterioration of the
Cuban economy, already depressed by the collapse of the former
socialist countries."7 0 The Act did, however, provide for
improvements in telephone communications between the two
countries and loosened restrictions on exporting medical supplies
61 DOMINGUEZ & PREVOST, supra note 47, at 100.
62 See JESSICA F. GIBBS, US POLICY TOWARDS CUBA: SINCE THE COLD WAR 27-36
(2009).
63 See id. at 21 ("Although there are different versions of the establishment of the
Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Reagan's first National Security Adviser
Richard Allen maintains that he encouraged conservative dmigr6s to form an
organization ... to lobby Congress.").
64 See ANN LOUISE BARDACH, CUBA CONFIDENTIAL xviii (2002) ("Despite their
small numbers (Cuban Americans make up .04% of the U.S. population), the influence
and clout of the Cuban exiles in Washington is almost without equal.").
65 See Hemndez, supra note 27, at 11.
66 See SWEIG, supra note 36, at 238.
67 See generally Hernndez, supra note 27, at 11-12 (discussing the groups that
influence U.S. policy toward Cuba).
68 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (2006).
69 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2006).
70 DOMINGUEZ & PREVOST, supra note 47, at 101.
5812013])
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to Cuba."
In 1996, the Cuban government shot down two airplanes
operated by the Cuban American group Brothers to the Rescue, an
anti-Castro organization based in Miami.72 Although many of the
details are unclear," the incident resulted in the death of four
Cuban Americans.7 4 In response to that incident, President Clinton
signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,
more commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act.75 In addition to
further strengthening and codifying the embargo, the Helms-
Burton Act "specified how the Cuban society must design a
'transitional government' without Fidel and Raul Castro and
described how to have a 'democratically elected government,"'
which was requisite before the president would be able to lift the
embargo." The most controversial piece of the legislation,
however, was Title III, which established procedures for U.S.
citizens whose property in Cuba had been nationalized by the
Castro regime to file claims in U.S. courts against any person who
"traffics" on the confiscated property 77
4. Change
The twenty-first century has not seen significant change in
U.S.-Cuban relations. Shortly before the 2000 presidential
election, President Clinton signed into law the Trade Sanctions
71 See id.
72 See id at 110.
73 There is debate about whether the airplanes were in Cuban airspace at the time
they were shot down. See id. The Cuban government maintains that the airplanes were
shot down during their second trip into Cuban airspace, which justified the Cuban
government's response. See id. As some familiar with the situation have acknowledged,
"it was clear that the exile organization was pushing the limits in challenging the Cuban
government and may have been seeking to provoke a confrontation between the two
governments." Id.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 105, 111.
76 DOMINGUEZ & PREVOST, supra note 47, at 109.
77 Id. For further discussion on the controversial nature of Title III, see Brice M.
Clagett, The Controversy over Title 1II of the Helms-Burton Act: Who Is Breaking
International Law-the United States, or the States that Have Made Themselves Co-
Conspirators with Cuba in Its Unlawful Confiscations?, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 271 (1996-97).
582 [Vol. XXXVIII
IN DEEPWATER: OFFSHORE DRILLING AND CUBA
Reform and Export Enhancement Act ("TSRA").78 The TSRA,
which lessened some of the trade restrictions on agricultural
products, was the result of a mounting anti-embargo coalition
whose constituents were part of the growing pro-engagement
community." There is now much agreement that the current
approach of U.S. policy toward Cuba, which remains organized
around a Cold War-era isolationist strategy, has failed to bring
about the collapse of the Castro regime and foster democracy on
the island." In 2009, President Barack Obama lifted a number of
restrictions on the ability of Cuban Americans to make family
visits to Cuba and send remittances to relatives, a change that the
majority of Americans, even those in South Florida, supported.'
In late 2009, however, Alan Gross, a contractor with the U.S.
Agency for International Development working on a democracy-
building project in Cuba, was arrested for the unauthorized
importation of satellite and other communications equipment to
the island, which Cuba considers a crime against the state.82 In
March 2011, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, which
brought an abrupt halt to the thawing relations between the United
States and Cuba.8 3
B. International Agreements
Despite their proximity, the United States and Cuba do not
have a bilateral agreement regarding oil spills.84 Notwithstanding
78 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2006).
79 See GIBBS, supra note 62, at 145-46.
80 See Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Evaluating the Prospects for U.S.-Cuban
Energy Policy Cooperation, in CUBA'S ENERGY FUTURE: STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO
COOPERATION 1, 1 (Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado ed., 2010) [hereinafter Benjamin-
Alvarado, Evaluating the Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Policy Cooperation] (noting
that the last half-century of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba "has relied on the
application of cold war measures-economic sanctions, technology denial, and political
isolation"); see also HUDDLESTON & PASCUAL, supra note 24, at 229-37 (discussing the
results of a 2008 opinion poll showing increased support in the Cuban American
community for improving relations with Cuba).
81 See Jorge I. Dominguez, Reshaping the Relations between the United States and
Cuba, in DEBATING U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS, supra note 27, at 43.
82 See Jonathan Weisman, Senators Urge Castro to Release American, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012, at A7.
83 See id.
84 See NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 11.
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the lack of a formal relationship, the two countries do cooperate on
other issues that involve mutual interests, such as drug
trafficking." The United States also made efforts to keep the
Cuban government informed about its response efforts to the
Deepwater Horizon crisis, which presented a threat of oil passing
through the Straits of Florida." Although both parties are
signatories to regional multilateral agreements regarding oil
pollution," some analysts advocate for a bilateral agreement
between the United States and Cuba that would clearly establish
each country's responsibilities in the event of a transnational oil
spill."
The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") is a
regulatory body within the United Nations specifically concerned
with promoting "safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean
oceans."" In response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the IMO
facilitated the adoption of the International Convention on Oil
Pollution, Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation ("OPRC"). 90
Both the United States and Cuba are signatories to this agreement,
which was designed to "establish measures for dealing with
pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other
countries." 9' As part of its efforts under the OPRC, the IMO
established a regional training center in Curagao, which works to
facilitate international communication and cooperation for oil
spills in the Caribbean region.92
Both countries are also signatories to the Convention for the
85 See generally MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41617, CUBA:
ISSUES FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011) (reporting on the recent developments in Cuba
and in U.S.-Cuban relations).
86 See Lesley Clark, U.S. Wary of Cuba's Drilling Plans, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 1,
2010), http://iw.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p product-News
Bank&ptheme=aggregated5&p action=doc&p docid= 1 32CE34C8C6DAFB8&pdocn
um=1 &pqueryname=1 (subscription required).
87 See NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 13.
88 See, e.g., Jorge Pifi6n, Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What
Could Happen If They Don't), HEMISPHERE, Spring 2011, at 25.
89 INT'L MAR. ORG., IMO WHAT IT Is 4 (2009), available at
http://www.imo.org/About/Documents/IMO%20What-it-is%20web%202009.pdf.
90 See NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 14.
91 Id.
92 See id. at 15.
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Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, more commonly known as the
Cartagena Convention.9 3 Like the ORPC, the Cartagena
Convention establishes protocols for information exchange among
the signatory countries regarding the domestic laws and
regulations, and institutions and procedures related to preventing
oil spills. 94 In late 2011 and early 2012, the IMO and several other
international organizations hosted a series of conferences and
workshops in the Caribbean region to help the countries develop
policy frameworks to prevent oil pollution from offshore
installations and to establish protocols for responding to offshore
drilling incidents.
III. Current Proposals and Why They Will Not Work
The current policies of the United States toward Cuba would
significantly hinder any effort to combat a major oil spill in the
Straits of Florida.9 6 In an attempt to illustrate some of the
"perverse effects" of the current U.S. policy toward Cuba, one
observer noted that, in order to comply with the embargo, "Repsol,
a Spanish oil company, is paying an Italian firm to build an oil rig
in China that will be used next year to explore for oil off the
shores of Cuba."9 7 This global consortium of sorts is the result of
Repsol seeking to comply with the provision of the Torricelli Act
that prohibits the sale to Cuba of any product of U.S.-origin.9
Yet, many familiar with the oil drilling industry have pointed out
that U.S. equipment is known for having the "most advanced
93 See id at 14.
94 See id.
95 See "Caribe" Newsletter Highlights Workshops on Ballast Water Management,
Oil Spill Preparedness, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEv. (Jan. 2012),
http://larc.iisd.org/news/caribe-newsletter-highlights-workshops-on-ballast-water-
management-oil-spill-preparedness/115921/.
96 See JORGE R. PNON & ROBERT L. MUSE, BROOKINGS INST., COPING WITH THE
NEXT OIL SPILL: WHY U.S.-CUBA ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IS CRITICAL 1 (2010),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0518
oilspill cubapinon/0518_oilspill cubapinon.pdf.
97 Marc Frank, Cuba Plans 7 Gulf of Mexico Oil Test Wells, REUTERS (Aug. 18,
2010, 2:30 AM), http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/idlNIndia-50901120100817?ca=rdt.
98 See 22 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (2006); see also 15 C.F.R. § 734.4 (2012) (excluding,
as de minimis, products containing less than 10% U.S. materials).
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technolog[y] in [the] field."99 Thus, the sweeping coverage of the
embargo, rather than effecting any real change in Cuba, actually
increases the risk of an oil spill in the Straits of Florida by
depriving the Cuban government of safer, more cost-effective
technology. 0 This section will discuss the contingency plans that
the United States has developed to respond unilaterally to an oil
spill in the Straits of Florida and why these plans do not provide
enough protection. Because the most effective means of
combatting a Cuban oil spill involve increased communication and
exchange between Cuba and the United States,' 0' the ultimate
issue is one of domestic policy accommodation.'02 The next
99 See U.S. Denies Cuba's Access to Oil Technologies, RADIO CADENA
AGRAMONTE (Oct. 21, 2010, 7:57 AM), http://www.cadenagramonte.icrt.cu/
english/index.php?option=com content&view-article&id=3065:us-denies-cubas-access-
to-oil-technologies&catid=2:cuba&Itemid=14; see also Benjamin-Alvarado, Evaluating
the Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Policy Cooperation, supra note 80, at 28
(discussing the potential benefits of "access [to] advanced technology (primarily U.S.-
based technology) and more investment capital"); infra note 100.
100 As Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado explained at a discussion held by the
Brookings Institution:
One of the things that has been apparent over the past 10 years in talking with
Cuban officials [in the oil industry] . . . is that their preferred partner is the
United States. Their preferred access to technology is, you know, is top-shelf
U.S., deep water exploration technologies.... [I]t's very frustrating for them
and it certainly increased the cost of their operations by having . .. to get
replacement parts from places like France or Great Britain as opposed to, you
know, one phone call away and overnight shipping from Houston for some of
the replacement parts for things that are essential to that particular industry.
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Professor of Political Sci., Univ. of Neb.-Omaha, Panel
Discussion at the Brookings Inst.: Cuba's Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to
Cooperation (Oct. 22, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/Files/events/2010/1022_cuba/20101022_cuba energy.pdf).
101 See, e.g., Pifi6n, supra note 88, at 25 (noting that the high likelihood that an oil
spill in the Straits of Florida will become transnational requires a procedural framework
that allows for the free movement of equipment and personnel).
102 But see Richard Sadowski, Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and
Prevention within the Framework of the United States' Embargo, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.
& POL'Y, Fall 2011, at 37 (arguing that the U.S. embargo against Cuba remains
necessary). Sadowski argues that "fears of a Cuban oil spill can be assuaged through
less drastic measures such as an oil spill emergency response agreement with Cuba,
similar to the one that the United States has enacted with Mexico." Id. Sadowski
advocates maintaining restrictions on Cuba's access to U.S. resources and technology-
dismissing the environmental concerns as "overblown." Id. at 38. This position,
however, ignores the reality of the danger posed by deepwater drilling in the Straits of
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section will examine the legislative proposals that have been
introduced to accommodate the increased risk of an oil spill in the
Straits of Florida.
A. Unilateral Response Plans
The U.S. Coast Guard maintains contingency plans for
responding to any offshore drilling accidents.'o Unlike the
Deepwater Horizon situation, the Coast Guard has limited
authority to respond to an oil spill in Cuba's exclusive economic
zone ("EEZ").'04  In their testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Rear
Admirals William Baumgartner and Cari Thomas explained that if
an oil spill occurs in Cuban waters, the oil rig operators and the
Cuban government are responsible for launching cleanup
operations and other efforts to prevent damage to the United
States."o' If an oil spill threatens U.S. waters or other natural
resources, however, the Coast Guard is required to respond. 10 6
The Coast Guard's Offshore Response Plan for Florida includes
ensuring its ability to cooperate with foreign governments and
corporations to respond to a spill, increasing communication
among state and local governments, and revising local
contingency plans."o7 Both the extent and the effectiveness of the
response plan, however, suffer from significant limitations.os
Florida, the impediments to a U.S.-led spill response created by the embargo, and the
actual ineffectiveness of the current U.S. policy toward Cuba. See discussion infra Parts
Il.A-B.
103 See Offshore Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas: The U.S. Coast Guard's Oil
Spill Readiness and Response Planning: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard
& Mar Transp., H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 112th Cong. 39 (2012)
[hereinafter Hearing on Offshore Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas] (statements of Rear
Admiral William Baumgartner, Commander, Coast Guard Seventh Dist. & Rear Admiral
Cari Thomas, Dir. of Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard).
104 See id. (noting that the Coast Guard's efforts to respond to an oil spill offshore
are designed to be consistent with domestic and international law).
105 See id at 41.
106 See id.
107 Id.
108 See id. Indeed, as Admiral Baumgartner's written testimony notes, "Such
response would focus on combating the spill as far offshore and as close to the source as
possible, using all viable response tactics in a manner consistent with domestic and
international law." Id In other words, U.S. response efforts could go only as far as the
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Despite the advanced technologies the Coast Guard has at its
disposal, a number of issues remain.109 As previously mentioned,
because there are no bilateral agreements between the United
States and Cuba concerning oil spill responses, if an oil spill were
to occur, the responsibility of combatting it would initially fall to
Cuba and the oil rig operators."o Some analysts have claimed that
Cuba is ill-equipped to respond to a major disaster."' Similarly,
because of the embargo, if a blowout like the one in the
Deepwater Horizon spill occurred, the Cuban government and the
oil rig operators would have to wait a week or more for the
necessary equipment to arrive before they could even begin
repairs.112 As journalist William Booth wrote in a March 2012
article in the Washington Post, "[i]f a blowout occurred, Repsol
would have to await delivery of a capping stack, which would
have to travel from Scotland to Cuba and then out to the rig.""'
Other estimates are even more startling: "In the event of a spill,
were assistance from U.S. firms permitted, relief would take 24-
48 hours to arrive on scene. Barring their participation, however,
it would take 30-50 days for help to arrive from Brazil, Northern
Europe, Africa, or S.E. Asia."ll 4
In an effort to address these concerns, the Office of Foreign
Assets Control ("OFAC") and the Bureau of Industry and Security
embargo would allow, which poses a number of problems. See infra notes 112-114 and
accompanying text.
109 Because of the fast-moving currents in the Straits of Florida, mechanical
skimming would be less effective than other methods of oil containment. Hearing on
Offshore Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas, supra note 103, at 26. The use of aerial
dispersants, then, is likely to be the most effective method. See id. But this method has
its own risks. In a "potential worse case spill of Deepwater Horizon proportions," for
example, it would take the dispersant manufacturer 24 hours to begin manufacturing
more dispersants. Id. It is estimated that oil in the Straits of Florida could travel as far
as 80 miles in that time frame. See id. at 26, 31.
110 Id. at 40.
Ill See, e.g., Booth, supra note 23. Former oil executive Jorge Pifi6n has asserted
that because Cuba maintains small naval and coast guard forces, it "has only 5 percent of




114 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMS., As CUBA PLANS TO DRILL IN THE GULF OF
MEXICO, U.S. POLICY POSES NEEDLESS RISKS TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST 24-25 (2010),
available at http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba-Drillingand US Policy.pdf.
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("BIS") recently issued to the U.S. Coast Guard a general license
that, in the event of an oil spill, would permit entrance into the
Cuban EEZ "with all necessary equipment that would be required
to aggressively respond to a spill in Cuban waters.""' This license
also allows the Coast Guard to call upon and extend the coverage
of its license to both public and private sector resources for
assistance in combatting a spill."l6 While this action gives the
Coast Guard and other organizations significantly more freedom to
respond to an oil spill off the coast of Florida, it does not go far
enough. Because all public and private sector organizations must
operate under the command of the Coast Guard's incident
commander to be covered by its license, there remains little
flexibility for organizations not directly called upon by the Coast
Guard to assist with response efforts.1 17 Thus, the effectiveness of
this licensing scheme is predicated on the assumption that the
Coast Guard response team will know what caused the spill and
what equipment is necessary to combat it."' The scheme also
assumes that the private sector resources called upon by the Coast
Guard will be prepared to respond to the situation. But as BP
Commission co-chairman William K. Reilly and energy expert
Megan Reilly Cayten indicated in a Washington Post opinion
piece, "[t]he private sector needs considerable time to ready an
effective response."1 9 Additionally, given the nature of private
115 Platts Energy Week: 02.05.12 Cuba Offshore Drilling (WUSA television




118 See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMs., supra note 114, at 28. According to the
Center's report, in response to a State Department official's statement that companies
would be granted licenses on a case-by-case basis, an "industry insider" cautioned
against the effectiveness of that proposal: "Do not let this statement fool you . .. we need
legislation and or an executive order allowing all petroleum services and equipment
companies to do business in Cuba. How are we going to know at the time of an accident
in Cuban waters what piece of equipment is going to be needed and from what
company? In case of an accident, we do not have the luxury to apply for a license for a
specific product and or service from a specific company." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
119 William K. Reilly & Megan Reilly Cayten, Op-Ed., Why the U.S. Should Work
with Cuba on Oil Drilling, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2012, at A21 (noting that engineers
need time to learn about the rig, the characteristics of the particular well, and the marine
environment).
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enterprise, calling upon resources at the last minute may prevent
the private sector from providing effective assistance, or any
assistance at all. 120
An even more fundamental problem is that the unilateral
response plans are effective only when an oil spill occurs. Given
the likelihood that the embargo would seriously delay any efforts
to repair a blowout or similar subsurface incident, two things are
clear. First, the United States should modify its policy toward
Cuba to give state and federal organizations and relevant private
sector firms more freedom to assist Cuba in the event of an oil
spill. Second, the United States should also implement changes to
allow more cooperation and coordination between the two
countries in an effort to reduce the risk of a spill.
B. Legislative Proposals
As mentioned above, several members of Congress have
introduced legislative proposals in response to Cuba's drilling
efforts.'2 1 The majority of these proposals are designed to prevent
Cuba from pursuing any offshore drilling efforts.12 2 As discussed
in the previous section, U.S. policy strategies oriented toward
isolation and deprivation, with the hope that the Castro regime will
give in and embrace democracy, have been ineffective, to say the
least. 123  Some experts on the subject have also argued that
insisting upon only these punitive-type sanctions has caused U.S.
policymakers to overlook several significant changes in the Cuban
regime and to pass up a number of opportunities to engage Cuba in
collaborative efforts. 124
120 See id. ("Certain resources may not be available if summoned at the last
minute."). The danger of the private sector being unable to assist is not insignificant. In
his congressional testimony, Admiral Baumgartner explained that "[t]here are Coast
Guard resources that can go out and attack the oil .. . [, b]ut the vast bulk of it is going to
be private sector." Hearing on Offshore Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas, supra note
103, at 31.
121 SULLIVAN, supra note 85, at 41-42 (noting that, at the time of publication,
legislation focusing on Cuba's offshore drilling and the potential for an oil spill had been
proposed in both houses of Congress).
122 See id.; NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 15-16 (reviewing the
legislative proposals on Cuba's offshore drilling that were introduced during the Illth
Congress).
123 See supra Part II.A.
124 See Benjamin-Alvarado, Evaluating the Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy
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In both the 111th and 112th Congresses, representatives from
South Florida and New Jersey, 12 5 whose districts contain the
largest populations of Cuban Americans and who typically push
for hardline policies against Cuba, 126 introduced several proposals
seeking to impose or increase sanctions against third countries that
assist Cuba in developing oil resources. 2 1
During the first session of the 112th Congress, Representative
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, in her new post as Chairman of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, introduced the Caribbean Coral
Reef Protection Act of 201 1.128 This bill seeks to extend the
Helms-Burton Act in a number of ways.'2 9 First, it would require
the Secretary of State to deny a visa to any person who is an
"officer or principal of an entity, or a shareholder who owns a
controlling interest in an entity" that has invested $1 million or
more in the development of Cuba's offshore oil resources, and it
would also impose a variety of economic sanctions against the
entity assisting Cuba.'30 Second, the Act would categorically
prohibit any U.S. citizen from providing "materials, technical
equipment, or other assistance that contributes to the enhancement
of Cuba's ability to develop petroleum resources" located
offshore.13 ' Thus, the Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act would
explicitly prevent the United States from providing any materials,
including a state-of-the-art blowout preventer, to the Cuban
Policy Cooperation, supra note 80, at 1-2.
125 Albio Sires, who represents New Jersey's 13th congressional district, and his
predecessor, current New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez, are among the Cuban
Americans serving in Congress. Marco Rubio, the junior senator from Florida, along
with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Fla. 18), Mario Diaz-Balart (Fla. 21), and David Rivera (Fla.
25) compose the remainder of the Cuban Americans currently serving in Congress.
126 See David Rieff, Will Little Havana Go Blue?, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, § 6
(Magazine), at 45.
127 See Press Release, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Ros-Lehtinen Criticizes
Administration Decision to Block Keystone, Allow Cuban Oil Drilling (Jan. 19, 2012),
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-display.asp?id=2173 ("I have authored
the Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act (H.R. 2047), which sanctions those who assist
the Cuban regime in the development of its petroleum sector." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
128 H.R. 2047, 112th Cong. (2011).
129 See id. (noting the context of the resolution).
130 Id. §§ 4-5(b).
131 Id. § 5(c).
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government.132
It also seeks, by threat of sanction, to deter foreign enterprises
from assisting Cuba."' Rather than allowing a company like
Repsol, which has a reputation in the offshore drilling community
for conducting safe and competent operations, to assist Cuba, this
bill would force Cuba to attempt deepwater drilling on its own.
The hope is that, without assistance, the cash-strapped Cuban
government will simply give up on its efforts to recover an
estimated 20 billion barrels of oil. This strategy is akin to a parent
taking away a daredevil child's elbowpads and kneepads, wrist
guards, and helmet as a means of discouraging the child from
skateboarding down the neighborhood's steep hills.
During the same legislative session, another South Florida
Congressman, Representative David Rivera, introduced the
Foreign Oil Spill Liability Act of 2011.14 This bill would amend
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to provide harsher liabilities for any
oil spill that occurred in Cuba's territorial waters.'3 5 In short, this
bill is nothing more than an attempt to deter foreign enterprises
from assisting Cuba. The Bahamas is set to begin offshore drilling
in 2012 not far from where Cuba is currently exploring and less
than 200 miles off the United States coastline.'3 6 Yet the raised
liability cap provision of this proposed legislation would not apply
to any drilling efforts by Bahamian companies or other foreign
companies assisting their efforts.13
Many experts who have studied this topic agree that the United
States should accept that Cuba is going to develop its oil resources
no matter how fiercely the Cuban American lobby opposes it.'3 8
132 See id
133 See id
134 H.R. 3393, 112th Cong. (2011).
135 Id. § 2 (explaining that the liability limits would triple if the incident causing
injury were to occur in the territory of a state sponsor of terrorism, as determined by the
Secretary of State).
136 David Goodhue, Bahamas Oil Drilling Could Begin by 2012, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.thebahamasweekly.com/publish/international/
Bahamas oil drilling could begin by_201218334.shtml.
137 See H.R. 3393.
138 See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 15,
Melissa Bert & Blake Clayton, Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill (March 2012)
("Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United
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The history of U.S.-Cuban relations certainly suggests that on
matters of interest to Cuba, Washington's opinion carries little
weight." 9  Accepting that Cuba is going to develop its oil
resources, rather than trying to prevent it, will allow the United
States to search for a more collaborative solution with Cuba. Once
a framework of collaboration and cooperation is established, both
countries will reap benefits that have long been overshadowed by
hostility.14 0  On March 5, 2012, Representative Jeff Flake
introduced the Western Hemisphere Energy Security Act of
2012,141 which is targeted at fostering a cooperative relationship
that would facilitate the prevention of an oil spill in the Straits of
Florida and ensure that both countries are better prepared to
respond if such an incident does occur.142  The Act would
categorically "permit United States companies to participate in the
exploration for and the extraction of hydrocarbon resources from
any portion of a foreign maritime exclusive economic zone that is
contiguous to the exclusive economic zone of the United
States."l 43 The Act would also permit U.S. individuals to "engage
in any transaction necessary" for the exploration and extraction of
oil resources in a qualified zone and would allow those resources
to be imported to the United States.144  It would further permit
individuals to "export without license authority all equipment
necessary for the exploration for or extraction of hydrocarbon
95145
resources, or oil spill prevention and clean-up activities . . . .
The Western Hemisphere Energy Security Act sets the kind of
accommodating and supportive tone 46 that has been unnecessarily
States."); CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMs., supra note 114, at 31 ("Punitive measures
designed to discourage foreign oil companies from doing business with Cuba will only
work for so long, if at all. Cuba will eventually drill, if not with Spanish companies with
Russians or with Chinese or others." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139 See Bert & Clayton, supra note 138, at 1-2.
140 See id. at 2-3.
141 H.R. 4135, 112th Cong. (2012).
142 See id.
143 Id. § 2.
144 Id § 3(a) (emphasis added).
145 Id. § 3(a)(3) (emphasis added).
146 See generally CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMs., supra note 114, at 39
(discussing the Act's potential to relax the U.S. embargo on Cuba and benefit both the
United States and Cuba).
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absent from U.S.-Cuban relations. 147  The following section
proposes other recommendations for U.S. policy that seek to
further the supportive engagement with Cuba in those areas of
mutual interest.
IV. Recommendations
The development of Cuba's offshore oil resources has sparked
the interest of a number of academics, foreign policy think tanks,
and environmental activist groups.148 This section of the note will
explore several of the more effective options while keeping an eye
toward practicality. 149 Due to the disagreement over the direction
U.S. policy should take, as evidenced by the various legislative
proposals introduced over the past several years, it is unlikely that
U.S. policy toward Cuba will change overnight."o Nevertheless,
making small changes that are in the best interest of both Cuba and
the United States, such as loosening restrictions on the ability of
private companies to assist Cuba's offshore drilling efforts, can
help provide a long-term framework for the normalization of
relations on mutually acceptable terms.
147 See generally Perez, supra note 27 (describing U.S. interactions with Cuba
following the Cuban Revolution as generally punitive).
148 See, e.g., PN96N & MUSE, supra note 96 (Brookings Inst.); Bert & Clayton,
supra note 138 (Council on Foreign Relations); The U.S., Cuba and Oil Diplomacy,
supra note 21 (Envtl. Def. Fund).
149 In seeking to provide practical recommendations, this note is mindful of the
considerable influence the pro-embargo establishment continues to wield. There are a
variety of strong arguments in favor of a more sweeping change, such as repealing the
embargo altogether. See generally Archibald R. M. Ritter, The Potential Economic
Implications of Normalization, in DEBATING U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS, supra note 27
(discussing the economic benefits of normalizing relations to both Cuba and the United
States). Considering the zeal on both sides of the debate over U.S. policy toward
Cuba-and particularly the embargo-this note intends to suggest cautious reform by
pushing only those policy modifications necessary to accommodate the risk created by
offshore drilling in the Straits of Florida. That being said, any policy modifications
should leave open the possibility for further reforms as they become necessary or
desirable.
150 See generally NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 14-18 (discussing the
various legislative proposals introduced in the 111th Congress and the I12th Congress).
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A. Domestic Policy Change
1. Immediate Steps the United States Should Take
Cuba is receptive to the idea of U.S. investment, especially
when it comes to offshore drilling."' Because the United States is
near the drill site and has significant experience with deepwater
drilling, there is a substantial economic interest in allowing private
companies to engage in Cuba's drilling efforts."s2 It is also
important to consider the economic impact of a spill. For
151 See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMs., supra note 114, at 16. In gathering data
for this report, the Center sent a delegation of scholars to Cuba to meet with officials of
the Cuban government's Ministry of Foreign Investment ("MINCEX"). According to
the Center for Democracy in the Americas ("CDA"), the MINCEX officials "repeatedly
emphasized that the country is open to any foreign investor and that Havana would
welcome U.S. investment. . . ." Id. In fact, when the Cuban government considered
drilling for oil in the 1990s, it initially sought investment only from U.S. energy
companies. Id. It was not until after U.S. companies declined to participate-citing
embargo implications-that the Cuban government looked for non-U.S. investors. See
id.
152 See Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy
Engagement: Findings and Recommendations, in CUBA'S ENERGY FUTURE: STRATEGIC
APPROACHES TO COOPERATION, supra note 80, at 111 [hereinafter Benjamin-Alvarado,
Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Engagement]. There are several incentives for the
United States to become involved in the development of Cuba's offshore oil resources.
First, the United States needs oil, and that fact is not changing with much haste. Being
close to an oil-exporting Cuba could provide another oil source with significantly
reduced transaction costs compared to the Middle East. Furthermore, Cuba's investment
in the oil production industry would become substantially more valuable to both
countries if U.S. companies were not restrained from providing equipment and services
to Cuba. See Jorge R. Pifl6n & Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Extracting Cuba's Oil and
Gas: Challenges and Opportunities, in CUBA'S ENERGY FUTURE: STRATEGIC
APPROACHES TO COOPERATION, supra note 80, at 34 [hereinaftaer Pifi6n & Benjamin-
Alvarado, Extracting Cuba's Oil and Gas] (pointing out that Cuba's natural market, the
United States, is also the largest oil-importer in the world). Second, because Cuba has
no local suppliers of oil producing equipment and supplies, those oil companies assisting
with offshore oil production must make significant plans to bring everything they need.
This is not only difficult, it is expensive-increasing the project cost by 30%. See
Ronald Soligo & Amy Myers Jaffee, Energy Balance and the Potential for Biofuels in
Cuba, in CUBA'S ENERGY FUTURE: STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO COOPERATION, supra note
80, at 84. Third, Cuba's refining capabilities are limited due to outdated technology. See
Benjamin-Alvarado, Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Engagement, supra. Finally, the
geographic proximity of the Gulf Coast refineries to the offshore tract would provide a
market for the excess crude oil. See id. (noting that access to the expertise, technology,
and capital of U.S. companies would allow Cuba to increase its refining capacity from
about 52,000 barrels per day to more than 75,000 barrels per day).
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example, the Florida Reef Tract-the world's third-largest barrier
reef-generates approximately $2 billion in revenue each year
from tourism.'5 3  This makes up only a fraction of the tourism
dollars that Florida receives each year, yet it supplies the state with
33,000 jobs.'5 4 Considering the economic benefits and
environmental security that would result from the United States
being actively involved in Cuba's drilling efforts, it makes sense
to lift the economic restrictions in a manner provided by the
Western Hemisphere Energy Security Act. 5
To take advantage of this engagement with the Cuban
government, the United States should develop a framework for
information-sharing between the two governments. The Center
for Democracy in the Americas suggests that "comprehensive
information sharing with the Cuban government [be] standard
operating procedure."' 56 This information-sharing could include
conducting joint workshops and conferences on issues of mutual
interest, such as offshore drilling, drug trafficking, and
immigration. It has also been suggested that information-sharing
include technology sharing.' Technology sharing could include
sharing oil spill mapping software with Cuba and providing it with
subsea oil spill response technology, such as dispersants. Finally,
U.S. regulatory agencies should engage their Cuban counterparts
on a regular basis rather than attempting to channel all
information-sharing through the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana.'s
2. Long Term Policy Changes
Aside from the short-term benefits discussed in the previous
section, getting the private sector involved with Cuba's energy
development could provide several long-term benefits to both the
United States and Cuba. This initial engagement should be
153 See Tim Padgett, The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at Arms
Length Over Spill Prevention, TIME, Jan. 27, 2012, at para. 7,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html.
154 See id
155 H.R. 4135, 112th Cong. (2012).
156 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMs., supra note 114, at 37.
157 See Benjamin-Alvarado, Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Engagement, supra
note 152, at 127.
158 See SULLIVAN, supra note 85, at 57.
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designed with a long-term view of encouraging U.S. investment in
Cuba's energy sector. The U.S. government should use this
opportunity as a way to help Cuba diversify its energy resources,
which will push Cuba toward obtaining energy independence.'
In doing so, the United States would help develop a new market in
Cuba for U.S. products designed to increase energy efficiency and
renewable energy sources. 16 0
Many commentators have also suggested that one of the best
ways to encourage economic reform in Cuba is to engage the
country as a new market, which naturally promotes economic
development and subsequent reforms.161 By encouraging
economic growth and development in Cuba during the current
period of economic transformation on the island,162 the United
States will directly benefit the Cuban people by empowering them
and allowing them to select their own form of government, rather
than imposing American democracy.163
Allowing the private sector to engage Cuba will ultimately
increase the people-to-people contacts in Cuba," revealing more
of the interests shared by the two communities. This increased
contact should ultimately lead Washington to engage in full
diplomatic communication. The United States should begin this
process sooner rather than later, so that it can help foster these
goals of energy independence, economic development, and
reform.
B. Potential International Agreement
It will also be important for the United States to create a
bilateral agreement with Cuba regarding oil spills. It has been
noted that "[t]he United States has strong spill-response
agreements with Canada, Mexico and Russia," causing some in
159 See PF&oN & MUSE, supra note 96, at 3-4.
160 See NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 16.
161 See Benjamin-Alvarado, Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Engagement, supra
note 152, at 127.
162 See NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 1.
163 See Lars Schoultz, The Blessings of Liberty: The United States and the
Promotion ofDemocracy in Cuba, 34 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 397, 425 (2002).
164 See Schoultz, supra note 60, at 153 (describing the general Cuban sentiment
favoring the development of economic and diplomatic relations with the United States).
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the field to suggest that the United States "make sure Cuba has the
same safeguards and rigorous oversight. We can't let politics get
in the way of common-sense actions."' 6 5 Several scholars suggest
using the MEXUS Treaty"' as a model for a bilateral agreement
between the United States and Cuba.'6 7 This type of treaty informs
both countries of their respective responsibilities in the event of a
transnational oil spill.168 It is critical to have plans already in place
to respond to an oil spill in regions like the Straits of Florida,
where hours can make a significant difference in the impact a spill
will have on the local marine environment.16 9
V. Conclusion
At the time this note went to print, the well Repsol had begun
drilling in February 2012, turned out to be dry, and the company
announced that it would stop drilling in Cuba's waters.'7 0
Following Repsol's exit, the Malaysian oil company Petronas took
over drilling efforts in the Straits of Florida."' In August 2012,
however, Petronas also announced that its well was not viable.17 2
In November 2012, after drilling a third unsuccessful well, the
Scarabeo 9 rig prepared to leave Cuban waters in an effort to
explore other, more lucrative prospects, temporarily stalling
Cuba's deepwater oil exploration.'7 3 Despite the lack of success
thus far, the potential of a major oil spill in the Straits of Florida
remains a significant threat. The estimated oil reserves off the
coast of Cuba will continue to attract foreign oil companies, who
165 The U.S., Cuba and Oil Diplomacy, supra note 21, at 11.
166 Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by
Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances, U.S.-Mexico, July 24,
1980, 32 U.S.T. 5899.
167 See NERURKAR & SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 13-14.
168 See id.
169 See id at 7-13.
170 EMILY A. PETERSON ET AL., ENvTL. DEF. FUND, BRIDGING THE GULF: FINDING
COMMON GROUND ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY PREPAREDNESS FOR OFFSHORE OIL




173 See Clifford Krauss & Damien Cave, Cuba's Prospects for an Oil-Fueled
Economic Jolt Falter with Departure ofRig, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A10.
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had already planned to explore Cuba's reserves for at least another
year.174
A change in the tone of U.S. policy toward Cuba is long
overdue.'75  Although there is significant bipartisan support for
shifting U.S. policy toward Cuba to a more engaging model,'7 1 the
sharply polarized environment in Washington seems to force
legislators to remain at loggerheads.'7 7 The intransigency of the
parties has led to repeated instances of brinkmanship,17 1 which is
counterproductive to the national interest. Engaging with Cuba in
the development of its energy resources is an issue that both
parties should be able to agree on, even over the objections of the
minority, who continue to take a hardline approach to anything
related to Cuba.179  This issue is simply too important. As Dan
Whittle, director of the Environmental Defense Fund's Cuba
Project, put it: "[T]his isn't about politics. It's about protecting our
beaches, our shores, our fishermen, our communities."'
174 PETERSON ET AL., supra note 170.
175 In a 2002 article, Cuban historian Louis Pdrez stated, "US policy stands at once
as an anomaly and an anachronism. It has outlived its historical time and outlasted its
political purpose." Pdrez, supra note 27, at 228. That was ten years ago, but the
sentiment remains. See, e.g., Free Trade With Cuba Act, H.R. 1887, 112th Cong. § 2
(2011) (finding that Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States, that the embargo is
counterproductive and harms the Cuban people, and that the United States can best
support democratic change through communication and exchange-an approach it takes
with former and other current communist countries).
176 See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMS., supra note 114, at 39.
177 See SULLIVAN, supra note 85, at 25-29.
178 For example, repeated instances of gridlock over raising the federal debt ceiling
in 2011 led to historically high congressional disapproval ratings. See Jeffrey M. Jones,
Congressional Job Approval Ties Historic Low of 13%, GALLUP (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149009/Congressional-Job-Approval-Ties-Historic-
Low.aspx (finding a record-setting 84% disapproval rate of Congress's job
performance).
179 See SULLIVAN, supra note 85, at 25.
180 All Things Considered, supra note 22.
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